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I.
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental basis of the complaint filed by PlaintifflAppellant Boise Tower
Associates, LLC ("BTA") is the factual allegation that RespondentslCross-Appellants City of
Boise and Timothy I-Iogland (collectively, "the City") rescinded BTA's building permit, causing
BTA to lose the financing it needed to complete the Boise Tower project. The specific legal
claims are all mechanisms for obtaining damages for the loss of the financing. Thus, if BTA's
factual premise is wrong-that

is, if the City's actions did not cause BTA to lose financing-

then BTA has suffered no cognizable damages, and its suits were brought frivolously and
vexatiously.
The BTA responds to the City's position by arguing that because the materials in the
"document dump" were not germane to the issues upon which the District Court ultimately
granted summary judgment, the trial court correctly declined to consider this evidence in
determining whether attorney fees should be awarded. In other words, although it is now
undisputed that the allegation the City caused BTA to lose its financing is, and was always false,
. . .,

...

because the City did not receive timely discovery responses establishing this
fact,,. the
is
..:,>.,.
- Court
. ..,.
, .
L
Zd

now powerless to hold BTA accountable. This position encourages frivolous litigation and
should not be approved by the Court. BTA mischaracterizes the document dump materials as
only relevant to mitigation. In fact, those materials actually speak to causation. Specifically, the
document dump shows that the City's temporary revocation of the building permit for the project
was not the cause of BTA's loss of financing. Moreover, BTA was aware of this fact at the time
its suit against the City was filed. The suit against the City was baseless and frivolously brought.
The suit in federal court against Washington Capital Management merely underscores the fact
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that the suit against the City was frivolous.
The error made by the District Court, and repeated in BTA's arguments, is the
assumption that the District Court was limited to the record presented at the summary judgment
hearing when determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded. Since the District Court
was not limited to the facts presented in support of sumnlary judgment, and the facts belatedly
disclosed by the BTA show that its allegations against the City were baseless, the City is entitled
to attorney's fees, both below and on appeal.

11.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE CORRECT STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

42 U.S.C. 4 1988.

BTA is correct that the award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Act is governed by
42 U.S.C. § 1988. See 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Thus, the proper standard of review is one for abuse
of discretion. See Parsons v. Mut. of Enurnclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614,
618 (2007). This Court must determine whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
.I

with the legal standards applicable tothe specific chowes available tpit; ah& (3) rezched its
decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp.,
139 Idaho 761,765, 86 P.3d 475,479 (2004). Nevertheless, as noted in the City's prior briefing,
this Court has held that attorney's fees under $ 1988 must be awarded if the moving party meets
the applicable requirements. See, e.g., Farner v. Idaho Falls Sch. Dist. No. 91, 135 Idaho 337,
342, 17 P.3d 281, 286 (2000); Lowder v. Minidoka County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho
834, 841, 979 P.2d 1192, 1199 (1999). Those standards are: "[Wlhere the action is
'unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious."' Nation v. State,

- Idaho -,

158 P.3d 953,
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969 (2007).

2.

I.C. fj 6-918A.

An award of attorney's fees under Section 6-918A is also discretionary. See I.C.

3 6-

918A. The standard for awarding the fees is that "the party against whom or which such award is
sought was guilty of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the
action." Id.

3.

Idaho Code 6 12-117.

Attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 are not discretionary. Rincover v. Dep't of
Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 549-50, 976 P.2d 473, 475-76 (1999). The statute provides that "the
court

shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's

fees, witness fees and reasonable

expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law." I.C.

3

12-117(1) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court may

conduct free review of the decision to award or deny an award of attorney's fees under $ 12-117.
Rincover, 132 Idaho at 550. In such review, the two issues confronting the court are: (1)
Whether the party requesting fees successfully achieved some form of favorable relief; and (2):
[An] assessment of the conduct of the other party to decide if that
party's activities'can be characterized as w i n g be%nuniessonabl$~
premised or undertaken upon either a set of facts or under relevant
legal principles applicable to the situation in which the parties were
engaged.

Id.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE'TIOS BY F.4ILING TO
CONSlDEIl TIIE CAUSATION EVIIIENCE: \\'HEN AWr\KL)ING ATTOKNEY'S

FEES.

BTA argues that the District Court correctly ruled that it could only consider the evidence
presented in support or opposition to summary judgment, rather than considering all evidence
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pertaining to the conduct of the litigation in determining whether the City had established a
factual basis to recover attorney fees. The District Court abused its discretion because, by not
considering all evidence available to it, the Court did not recognize, and did not employ, the full
extent of its discretion. By continuing to assert this reasoning, BTA is essentially shifting the
responsibility for its own wrongdoing in failing to timely disclose critical evidence-the
document dump-from

itself to the City. BTA's position is that the City that should be faulted

for not uncovering BTA's concealment of critical evidence. There is no legal basis for this
position, and it is contrary to Idaho policy.
Motions for attorney's fees are governed by Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under the Rules, the prevailing party is entitled to its costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). To
obtain costs, a memorandum of costs must be filed no later than 14 days following entry of final
judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). Attorney's fees may also be awarded as costs when authorized by
statute or contract. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and 54(e)(5). However, unlike costs, "the claim for
attorney fees as costs shall be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis ... [for]
the attorney fees claim." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5). If there are objections made to the motion for fees,
"[tlhe court may conduct an evidentiary hearing, if it deems it necessary, regarding the award of
;

,,::' '

...

'

attorney fees." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). And, in fact, the Rules specifically provide that:
[Alttorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded
by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.. ..
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Thus, the Rules contemplate that a party requesting fees will support its
request with the applicable facts establishing the opposing party litigated the case in a frivolous
manner. The court may go so far as to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider those facts. See
a&o Browning v. Browning, 136 Idaho 691, 696, 39 P.3d 631, 636 (2001) (upholding denial of
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attorney's fees where the part requesting fees failed to provide any citations to the record andlor
to supply additional evidence considering the factors supporting such an award).
When attorney's fees are based on the conduct of one or the other party, "[ilt is the
totality of the circumstances, rather than a particular item alone, that suffice for an award of
attorney's fees." Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 33 (1'' Cir.
2002) (considering award of fees for trademark infringement where fees could only be awarded
where the acts of infringement were malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful). See also
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F.Supp.2d 111, 118 (D. Mass. 2001)
(awarding attorney fees in part because the plaintiffs "hardball conduct" in pwsuing the
litigation provided evidence of improper motive); Shangold v. Walt Disney Co., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 748, Case No. 03 Civ. 9522 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006) (dismissing action and awarding
attorney's fees and costs because of the plaintiffs conduct in fabricating evidence and
manipulating the judicial process). Where the conduct justifying fees is different from the
conduct establishing liability, courts have also recognized that the evidence between the two may
differ. See Dickey-John Corp. v. Int'l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329,349 (7thCir. 1983) (in a
patent infringement case, noting that the arguments and facts to support an award of fees for

9
willful and wanton infringement differ from that of pursuing litigation in bad faith). See also

. 1982) (in relation to federal
United States v. Univ. Savings Assoc., 666 F.2d 3 12, 3 14 (5th Cir.
fee statute similar to I.C.

5

12-1 17, applying different evidentiary standard for fees versus the

underlying issue); Deere & Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 658 F.2d 1137, 1148 (7" Cir. 1981)
(refusing to award attorney fees in patent infringement suit where there was no evidence of
misconduct in pursuing the case).
In short, the rules of procedure do not prohibit a court from considering additional
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evidence as to attorney's fees, and, in fact, encourage such evidence. Moreover, the evidencc to
support to an award of attorney's fees based on the conduct of the party depends on the totality
of the circumstances, and the evidence to be considered may differ from the evidence relevant to
the underlying claim. Thus, in deciding to award attorney's fees, the District Court should have
considered the evidence that BTA pursued this litigation with full knowledge that the reason
BTA lost its financing was due to negotiation strategies it undertook with potential financiers and
not the City's actions vis-A-vis the building permit.1 This evidence shows that the BTA's claims
against the City were brought frivolously and were not well grounded in fact or law. That BTA
brought a separate suit in federal court against Washington Capital Management alleging it
caused BTA to lose its financing merely underscores this fact.'
BTA has also claimed that it did not have an opportunity to fully litigate the facts in the
document dump. This argument is flawed for three reasons. First, there is nothing to litigate-the
documents all came from BTA and speak for themselves. Second, BTA could have litigated the
1 The evidence provided to the District Court revealed the BTA's financing problems were
caused by its refusal to pay application and lending fees. The stop work order and any disputes
concerning the building permit had no bearing on those negotiations. See R143, Exhibit 12, Alan
Affidavit, Exhibit H, Bates #08251 (April 24, 2003 letter from AMS Commercial, LLC stating
that "It appears that the conversation [with CMI] b~ggecijciownon the topic of the $25,000 fee.";
Exhibit H,Bates +YO8256(May 14, 2003 letter from BTA asking for a waiver of the $25,000 fee);
Exhibit H, Bates #08324 (May 16, 2003 letter from AMS Commercial, LLC noting that but for
the dispute over the $25,000 fee, "The loan could have probably been closed by now."). As
explained by CMI loan officer, J. Kim Powell, any circumstances surrounding the building
permit were never an issue or a barrier to fimding. Instead, as explained by Ms. Powell, the
"barriers to financing through CMI included the failure of Mr. Peterson to provide [CMI] with
any meaningfbl documentation supporting his loan application, his unwillingness to pay an
application fee, sign and execute the loan application, and his untenable attitude." See R143
(Powell Affidavit).
BTA argues that the suit against Washington Capital Management is akin to alternate
pleadings. The difference here is that BTA appeared before one court, arguing that Washington
Capital Management was responsible for the failure of its project, and then appeared before
another court to allege that the City was responsible for the failure of its project. Unlike pleading
in the alternative, BTA presented mutually exclusive theories to two different courts such that
neither court would be able to decide or apportion liability between the two theories.

'
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documents either by requesting a hearing pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) andlor by submitting
affidavits and argument in opposition to the request for attorney's fees. Third, to the extent that
BTA actually was not able to litigate the facts, it was due to its own failure to timely disclose
those documents in response to the City's discovery requests.
Accordingly, the facts show that BTA filed andlor pursued this claim frivolously and
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Similarly, BTA has pursued this appeal frivolously and
with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Accordingly, the City is entitled to attorney's fees both
before the District Court and on appeal.
C.

IDAHO CODE 6 12-117 IS APPLICABLE.
BTA argues that Idaho Code 3 12-1 17 is not applicable to its claims brought under Idaho

law, but that only Idaho Code

3

6-91814 is applicable. BTA's reasoning is flawed for two

reasons.
First, this Court has held that as to tort actions brought pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims
Act, I.C. § 6-9184, is to be applied in favor of

12-121 because

6-918A was the later statute

and "a more specific statement of the legislature's intent about the award of attorney fees in tort
Idaho
394, 400, 901 P.2d 501, 507 (1995).
claims cases." See Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127
.. .
..
,

v,::

k6'>

This reason does not entirely apply in this ease because § 12-117 (enacted in 1984) is the later of
the two statutes. C.J I.C. 9 6-914A (enacted in 1978).
Second, and more significantly, is that not all of the claims brought by BTA against the
City defendants (exclusive of the federal claims) were state tort claims. Count Five of BTA's
Complaint alleges a denial of due process under both the federal and Idaho constitutions. See R.
22. Count Six alleges a denial of equal protection under both the federal and Idaho constitutions.
See R. 23. Count Seven alleges an unlawful taking under the Idaho constitution. See R. 23-24.
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Count Ten alleges that the City defendants owe a duty of indemnification to BTA for certain
claims brought by the Capital City Development Corporation (CCDC). See R. 27. Thus,
irrespective of whether the City is entitled to attorney's fees as to the two state law torts alleged
against the City defendants, the City defendants are also entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to $
12-117 for at least those non-tort state law claims described above.

111.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's Order denying the RespondentKrossAppellant's attorney fees should be reversed.
DATED this 21st day of July, 2008.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
B

y
&
~
u
Philliv J. Collaer, Of the Firm
~ t t o k e syfor ~efendantsl~es~ondents
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Eric S. Rossman
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